Presidential Findings and Their Impact on U.S. National Security

Presidential Finding signed by President Reagan to authorize the CIA to conduct covert operations in Central America to aid the Contra rebels in their fight against the Communist-backed Sandinista government in Nicaraqua.

During the Vietnam War nearly every kind of intelligence operation you can think of was undertaken by the U.S. Intelligence Community. The four most heavily engaged agencies, starting with the most utilized first, were: the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. As the War dragged on, with public, Congressional, and Presidential frustration mounting, increased pressure was applied on intelligence activities, especially the CIA, to help turn the War in a more positive direction.

Thomas Ahern, a CIA intelligence officer, who started his career in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, wrote an excellent book, “Vietnam Declassified,” about the CIA and the many types of intelligence operations undertaken in Vietnam. He cites an exasperating meeting about a problem with a certain pacification program led by the CIA, during which someone tossed out a new idea. William Colby (future CIA director), who was the CIA’s Saigon station chief at the time, replied that he was willing to try anything—if it would work. The mounting, across-the-board frustration, left the CIA and its cohort agencies, grasping at straws.

William Colby became the new Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in September 1973, just a month after American combat activity ceased in Southeast Asia. Colby’s tenure would be a brief 2 ½ years. Before the year was over, allegations began to surface in the press about questionable intelligence activities during the War. Press allegations continued throughout 1974, and murmurings started-up in Congress about possible Intelligence Community improprieties. By time Colby left office he would arguably hold the distinction of testifying before Congress more than any other DCI. By January 1975 both the Senate, and House of Representatives, were conducting hearings about the impropriety allegations. Senator Frank Church chaired one committee, and Congressman Otis Pike chaired a similar investigation committee in the House.

All of this external attention on the Intelligence Community resulted in passage of several new laws to tighten-up accountability and oversight of certain critical, intelligence operations. For the most part, the type of operations that were closely looked at, and caused the most angst with Congress, were those in which the importance to U.S. National Security was ill-defined; in essence, justifying a direct benefit to the Unites States was a stretch, at best.

U.S. Foreign Policy has a range of options available to the President in order to achieve his goals. The low end of the scale espouses the use of diplomacy to achieve American goals overseas. At the opposite end of the spectrum from diplomacy is military intervention. Starting in the post-World War II era, and continuing to this day, foreign relations between countries have become so complex that often times using pure diplomacy is ineffective; but, military intervention is too much. The gray area between State Department diplomacy, and Defense Department military operations, is often the domain of the CIA using Covert Action to achieve American foreign policy goals. It is this genre of intelligence operations that garnered such a strong backlash from Congress and the public after Vietnam.

Regardless the type of intelligence operation being mounted, they all have an appropriate level of Operational Security – “OPSEC.” OPSEC is usually manifested in three categories:

• Clandestine operation: An operation sponsored or conducted by a U.S. government department or agency in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. Clandestine operations are the usual means of OPSEC for espionage and/or intelligence collection, which is the “bread n’ butter” spying conducted by the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. The biggest reason intelligence collection is conducted with clandestine OPSEC is most adversaries, upon detecting espionage activity, move quickly to render useless anything that was purloined. For example, clandestinely photographing an enemy’s communication code books. If the collection activity is discovered, the enemy will stop using the compromised codes, and the photographed code book has no further value. Being undetected is paramount in clandestine operation.

• Covert operation: An operation of the United States Government that is planned and executed to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly (i.e.; plausible deniability).

• Clandestine and Covert operation: The operation must be undetected, and the sponsor’s identity is concealed.

By the very nature of clandestine operations, they tend to be low-key. Any sort of violence associated with the operation tends to cause the lack of detection to be tossed right out the window.

Covert operations conducted by the CIA, for example, are less concerned about remaining undetected during the operation, or afterwards. Of greater concern is running the operation so it cannot be traced back to the United States. In this sense, it is a fact-of-life that covert operations tend to have more violence attached, destroying property and/or killing enemy personnel to prevent them from reporting who or what they saw. As noted previously, when diplomacy fails, but, direct military intervention is too heavy handed, a plausibly deniable covert operation often becomes the tool-of-choice for resolving vexing problems. Up until Colby’s DCI tour, and the Church & Pike Committees, the CIA regularly conducted operations using all three OPSEC categories. Covert operations bears the majority of public and Congressional opposition. This led Congress to add language in Title 50 U.S. Code, requiring a documented Presidential Finding for covert operations.

Prior to the law being changed to require a Presidential Finding, an extremely sensitive covert operation was usually briefed to the President for his buy-in. The law was moot, however, on any formal requirement to seek the President’s buy-in, nor was there a requirement to document the Presidential Briefing in writing, nor to obtain an actual signature by the President, approving the covert action. Aside from the President’s buy-in, the law was also silent about informing key members of Congress about an impending covert action.

Once the law took effect, all covert actions had to be documented in a signed Presidential Finding, and it had to contain an explanation of why it was necessary to conduct the operation, including the identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States, and the covert action’s importance to U.S. National Security. Lastly, the Presidential Finding must be presented to both Congressional intelligence committees.

National Security

National Security Letters: What Are They, How Are They Managed & Implemented, and What is Their Impact on U.S. National Security Policy?

national_security_letter-sample_nov2007

A National Security Letter issued to the Internet Archive by the FBI in November 2007.

A national security letter (NSL) is a type of subpoena that can be issued by designated U.S. intelligence & security establishments, and does not require approval by a federal court judge. The Right to Financial Privacy Act, Stored Communications Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act, all contain provisions that allow the USG to request & obtain information relevant to an approved national security investigation. Previously, there was no uniform statute implementing NSL procedures; so, a law to do so was enacted. The two primary concerns voiced in opposition to the NSL’s usage is: an NSL does not require a court order (i.e.; signed by a federal court judge), and NSL’s normally contain language directing the NSL recipient to not publicly disclose any aspect of the NSL, including the simple fact of acknowledging receipt of an NSL.

There are several federal court cases concerning the legality of the NSL Law. It will likely end up in the Supreme Court’s hands because the two sides to the issue are not backing down based on lower court rulings thus far. It doesn’t mean the Supreme Court will necessarily have to take the case; they could decline and let a lower court ruling stand as is. The Law currently states an NSL can only request non-content information, for example: recorded transactions, dialed phone numbers, and e-mail addresses. Since the above statutes pertain to legal entities, such as a real person or a company, their names are not protected information. Although organizations such as the phone company or an internet e-mail provider that receives an NSL are barred by the Law from disclosing the content of e-mails or phone calls, the names of the parties involved are releasable.

Foreign Policy Research & Analysis

Formulating a country’s Foreign Policy choices: What is the basic framework most commonly used?

foreign-policy-word-cloud

Without regard to making judgments about a country’s Foreign Policy process, lack of process, or flawed process (at least for now), the basic way a nation-state goes about determining their Foreign Policy choices is pretty much the same. Emphasizing a non-judgmental approach to this, all country’s Foreign Policies touch on, to one degree or another: 1.) Goals & objectives a country is looking to achieve abroad; 2.) The principles or ideals that led a country to those goals; 3.) The means or methods to achieve them. Complicating matters, it has become all too prevalent in the past 20 years for non-state actors to start civil wars, insurgencies, and promulgate acts of terrorism. Disruptive non-state actors create infrastructure havoc; often rendering a government unable to develop and pursue legitimate Foreign Policy goals. A sampling of states-in-crisis unable to promulgate a viable foreign policy agenda include: South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Chad, to name a few.

In 1962 a German-American political scientist, Arnold Wolfers, PhD, wrote a seminal work entitled, “Discord and Collaboration Essays on International Politics.” In his book, Wolfers was quoted as saying, “decisions and actions in the international arena can be understood, predicted, and manipulated, only in so far as the factors influencing the decisions can be identified.” This is, indeed, the case with many countries in the 21st Century, simply stated, “Why do/did they do that?”

James N. Rosenau was a well-known political scientist, author and academician as a Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University until he passed away in 2011 at the age of 86. Rosenau developed a theory and method of explanation in 1966 to the question, “Why are the values and goals behind American Foreign Policy resistant to change?” The “Funnel of Causality” to be discussed below is the basis for Rosenau’s theory.

The Constitution makes it clear the President of the United States has the lead role in Foreign Policy development and implementation. The evolutionary nature of American Foreign Policy, however, has developed over the past two centuries into a very pragmatic institution. Those Americans ascending to the Presidency soon find out the pragmatism of the Foreign Policy machine is far more resilient than they ever imagined. As it has been said over and over again, “the Presidency is a lot harder than it looks.”

All American Presidents ponder before, during and after their term-in-office, about their legacy – “what is the mark I made on history?” Whereas, many Presidents thought the country, in general, and the Presidency, in specific, were broken – in need of a major overhaul – they soon found out the Oval Office itself, had equal or greater control over the actions of a Presidential administration than any one occupant.

The phenomenon of “Oval Office precedence” may explain why Democratic Party leaders found President Carter, once in office, to be much less liberal than they hoped for. Or, why was Ronald Reagan a less conservative leader than Republicans thought they were getting? Bill Clinton has been variously described as either “the most conservative liberal” the pundits had ever seen, or, “the most liberal conservative” they ever came across.

These comments and questions are the essence of what Rosenau intended to explain about American Foreign Policy. As it turned out, Rosenau’s concept also served to better understand the Foreign Policy choices of other nations, too.

Rosenau utilized the concept of a funnel to control the flow of what goes into the large opening, and comes out of the small opening…this is the “Funnel-of-Causality.” All external factors, problems and opportunities are part of the funnel opening, labeled “External Sources.” The important thing to remember about the External Sources is they all have the potential of being recognized at the front-end of the Foreign Policy Process before any strategic shaping occurs. Those personnel within a government institution charged with monitoring the outside world, or sometimes it is someone who is not a part of any government, yet, still monitors external sources, like the media, for example, can make a preliminary analysis to decide if the discovery warrants further attention. Whether someone is a formal, global analyst or not, there are far more reasons a discovered external issue stalls or never makes it any farther than simple recognition that “it” is out there.

The key to any external issue getting to the next level, “Societal Sources,” is if those conducting surveillance of the external landscape come across something either good or bad, that they know has some interest to a portion of society in the country under review. If the external issue, however, does not have enough public interest warranting the expenditure of time and resources to vet it further, it is going to remain shelved in the Societal Sources section until something changes.

If an external issue is deemed important enough by a country’s society (i.e.; the court-of-public-opinion), “Government Sources,” who are formally charged with deep dive research & analysis, are now going to strategically and tactically pick apart the issue with potential Foreign Policy implications. The inputs and efforts by those individuals and institutions in this source category, as might be expected, have the longest throughput time, if done correctly.

When a Government research analyst engages their “deep dive,” they are going to vet every possible aspect of the who, what, why, when, where, how, and an estimate of the cost & resources to do something about the issue at hand. A third and fourth aspect in this category is any past precedent, and vetting for possible legal constraints.

Legal constraints in a country like the United States can present a formidable challenge to forward movement of a Foreign Policy issue. Not only are the U.S. Constitution, and codified law taken into consideration, but, case law (i.e.; Supreme Court decisions), Executive Orders, Presidential Findings (authority to take covert and/or clandestine action by the Intelligence Community), and treaties must figure into a decision to stop or delay forward progress of a Foreign Policy issue.

The Role Sources category is comprised of those positions, or jobs within any government whereby a person’s role can affect the outcome of a Foreign Policy decision. A governmental role may be similarly defined based on a legal, or other pre-existing requirement, and precedence. The constraints of a role-based source include those placed on the President, the National Security Council, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, and the DOD Secretary, to name a few. As much as a role player has their own personal feelings about a Foreign Policy issue, they may have certain role-based constraints that tend to shape the official policy position, and there is no room for personal preference.

An example of this occurred during the Vietnam War. As President Nixon’s administration was managing the Vietnamization process, Congress felt it was taking too long to exit the War. It seemed like each time the Vietnamization process took two steps forward, an evolving situation, like North Vietnam’s invasion of the South in March 1972, caused the exit efforts to take one, large step backwards. This “backsliding” scenario, as Congress saw it, was derailing the Vietnamization program. To prevent more issues from stalling the exit strategy, Congress began writing laws to cutoff funds for American combat operations in Southeast Asia. The Nixon White House kept finding the money elsewhere to continue combat support operations for South Vietnam. Eventually, Congress enacted further legislation to completely outlaw in the region, U.S. military expenditure of any sort of ordnance or munitions. In the case of each new law, Nixon vetoed the bill; but, Congress mustered the two-thirds “super-majority” and overturned each veto.

The Nixon/Vietnam example shows that the Foreign Policy choices of Nixon were within the role-based privileges afforded the President of the United States as the military’s Commander-in-Chief. Congress, taking one-step-at-a-time, enacted legislation to remove the President’s role-based options. Regardless how much Nixon (or Gerald Ford, later on) wanted to promulgate U.S. military support for South Vietnam, they were constrained by laws placed on the Presidential role of Commander-in-Chief. What either President wanted to do, personally, in this Foreign Policy situation was rendered immaterial.

The final segment of the Foreign Policy funnel is the influence of individual people on how the final, developed Foreign Policy position is put-into-play. A good example of an individual source of influence on a U.S. Foreign Policy position, was that of using military force during the unfolding debacle of the Balkan states – Kosovo, Bosnia, Serbia, etc. – and the actual choices of intervention and/or support made by President Clinton. Not only did Clinton, as the President, have the authority as Commander-in-Chief to deploy American ground combat troops to the region, he also had bi-partisan support of both houses of Congress. Clinton chose to only engage the military for air combat; no ground troops were sent.

Why did Clinton make the choice that he did? Many experts felt Clinton was uncomfortable about the possibility of the Balkans War becoming like another Vietnam. It was Clinton’s age group who took the brunt of ground combat and death in Vietnam; Clinton, however, avoided it by not serving in the military. Since he never served in the military, he did not want the label of “talking-the-talk,” but not walking-the-walk. Again, this is supposition by political scientists.

It is easy to see why U.S. Foreign Policy positions change so slowly. The funneling process forces decisions to move carefully. American Foreign Policy outputs take the pragmatic approach, as well as, the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” philosophy.

A five segmented Foreign Policy Process Funnel is typical, and well understood by western democracies. But, what about governments based on traditional monarchies, dictatorships, religion-based governments, or socialism-based (Communist) governments? The “Funnel” is still applicable, but can be significantly different than the five segment funnel process common to democracies.

For example: A Foreign Policy issue has been identified as something requiring action by the head-of-government in a dictatorship. Since the very presence of a dictator indicates there is a less likely regard for the “rule-of-law,” a Foreign Policy choice often does not go much beyond the Dictator’s personal preference. The Foreign Policy net result is: “whatever the Dictator says it is, is what it is!”

In any form of non-democratic government there is always a possibility of the traditional five-segment Foreign Policy Funnel having one or more levels completely removed, truncated, or otherwise corrupted. Making decisions based on inadequate professional due diligence can result.

It is worth mentioning here, a few comments about the Foreign Policy practices exercised by the Nazi government of Germany from 1933 to 1945. Before going any further, note that Nazi Germany’s Foreign Minister from 1938 to 1945, was Joachim von Ribbentrop. Keep in mind that prior to joining the Nazi Party in 1932, Ribbentrop’s Foreign Policy “experience” was solely based on frequent global travel as a businessman, period. He had no academic standing as a trained foreign policy specialist, nor had he ever held any type of position as a government employee, except as a German soldier in World War I.

Ribbentrop first became useful to Adolf Hitler in 1932 as a secret, backdoor, go-between with the top democratically-elected leaders of the German government. This only occurred due to Ribbentrop’s personal friendship with a couple of the politicians. Ribbentrop’s character traits were probably the worst ones to have as he began mixing it up with career politicians and the Nazis. He was the quintessential “yes man,” or, using a more modern label, a “suck-up.” Ribbentrop was also an opportunist, an inveterate intriguer, and an upwardly mobile wannabe. Ribbentrop’s dislike was nearly universal among the top Nazi leaders, such as Josef Goebbels, Herman Goering, etc. He was intensely disliked by Germany’s professionally trained and experienced military leaders.

Ironically, looking at the outcome of World War II, the Allies benefited, to a certain degree, by a cadre of German Nazi leaders like, Hitler, Ribbentrop, Himmler, et al, who lacked the education and professional credentials to be in the offices they held. With Germany being one of the most well educated, technologically & socially advanced countries in the World, if the cream-of-the-crop rose to the top across the entire government instead Hitler & his cronies, the World might have looked vastly different today. To be sure, the likes of Joaquim von Ribbentrop induced the Nazi government to be far more extreme than what might have occurred without someone fanning-the-flames. In an interview after the War, a Ribbentrop aide said: “When Hitler said ‘Grey’, Ribbentrop said ‘Black, black, black’. He always said it three times more, and he was always more radical [than Hitler].” It was not a case of Ribbentrop holding more radical personal beliefs than Hitler and other top Nazis. Ribbentrop’s approach was to take whatever idea Hitler expressed, and turn it into a “BIG idea.”

The results of the Hitler/Ribbentrop-led German Foreign Policy apparatus gave Ribbentrop all of the notoriety & recognition he could ever want: He was tried and convicted at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal after the War. Many top Nazis committed suicide at the end of the War, including: Hitler, Goebbels, Goering and Himmler. Ribbentrop, however, was convicted in a court-of-law, and was one of the few remaining top Nazis who were actually executed for their crimes.

I have discussed all of this to illustrate what often happens to a country’s Foreign Policy apparatus in the hands of an illegally-formed government. Policies, practices, pragmatism and rule-of-law are thrown out the window. In a toxic political climate like this, a disciplined Foreign Policy apparatus is often dismantled, circumvented, or poisoned. It is no longer based on “the will of the people,” but, a misshaped viewpoint of the few. As much as a careful, pragmatic Foreign Policy process may frustrate some people, the number of correct choices far outweigh the gaffs. This then, illustrates how far off-kilter a country’s Foreign Policies can become without some sort of structure and rigor-of-process.

In summary, by using the Policy Funnel in any country, it smooths-out the rough political, legal, ethical and moral edges via a conservative path that makes decisions with greater insight & care. It is far less likely for a head-of-government to promulgate a poor (read: bad) Foreign Policy choice when Rosenau’s Funnel, or something like it, is the basis of the process.

National Security

Academically speaking, what is “Security” in This Day and Age?

national-security-graphic_oct2016

The first factor to consider in discussing “Security,” or as it’s more commonly known, “National Security,” is some basic definitions applicable to any country. These “basics” are not all inclusive, but, they represent the most common National Security factors that are intrinsic to any country’s sovereignty.

Citizen protection, health & well being;
Protecting a country’s strategic infrastructure;
Physical protection of a country’s sovereign territory;
Ensure the security of a country’s natural resources;
Ensuring the political stability of the country’s governmental institutions (i.e.; executive branch, legislature, and judiciary);
Maintain a country’s free access to adjacent international waters and airspace.

Every country has the right to at least the preceding National Security measures without encroachment by any other state actor, non-state actor, or by externally encouraged insurrection.

Most third world countries are incapable of looking beyond these six basic National Security factors. The truth be told, many third world nations are challenged to the hilt just trying to keep their basic factors from encroachment. In a general sense, third world countries are so self-absorbed just trying to get the six basics right, that there’s little means, opportunity or time to concern themselves with a crisis brewing in a far off land, and whether that other country’s strife could somehow effect their own country. An example of this might be a country like Laos, and the ISIS conflict raging in Syria and Iraq. It is unlikely the ISIS conflict has any direct or even indirect affect on Laotian National Security. And if the ISIS conflict did have an impact on Laos, what could Laos do about it? Nothing.

But, could the same be said for ISIS’ impact on Great Britain? No, it could not. The larger the economy, the greater the infrastructure, the increased sophistication of a country’s society or industry, a higher degree of advanced education systems (i.e.; colleges, trade schools, etc), the higher per capita worker earnings, and Gross Domestic Product means a country like Great Britain has more tactical and strategic interest of problems brewing in other countries. Great Britain may have a great need for Middle-eastern oil, or they have significant business interests in foreign countries, etc. In a nutshell, a world economic and military power like Great Britain would not be able to maintain the security and prosperity it has attained by only concerning itself with the “basic six.”

The U.S. Congress enacted legislation over six years ago, requiring the President to publish every five years, a National Security Strategy. I have pasted a hyperlink below, so you can review the 2015 NSS yourself. Two definitions pasted below are the U.S. Government’s official position:

Security: 1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security.

National Security: A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relations position; or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.

The 2015 NSS did not change the 2010 U.S. National Enduring Interests that form the backbone of the current NSS:

The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
Respect for universal values at home and around the world, and;
A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

The 2015 NSS listed the following top strategic risks to U.S. interests:

Catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland or critical infrastructure;
Threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and our allies;
Global economic crisis or widespread economic slowdown;
Proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction;
Severe global infectious disease outbreaks;
Climate change;
Major energy market disruptions, and;
Significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime).

The United States learned 115 years ago under the leadership of President Theodore Roosevelt, that America no longer had the ability to remain isolated; the relationship to other countries, was now of strategic interest to American prosperity. This is why the U.S. Armed Forces are deployed globally to ensure a number of issues do not affect the United States. The 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated what can and will happen on U.S. soil, if the U.S. fails to project their security interests worldwide. The U.S. can no longer remain insulated and expect the problems overseas to remain there. Problems & crises elsewhere will come to our shores if our National Security interests do not go beyond the basic six.

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doc…

Foreign Policy Research & Analysis

Did Iran Technically Violate the Recent November 2015 Nuclear Accord by Testing Missiles?

sajil-missile-iran

First, let me say this, I lived and worked in Iran as a young man from 1976 to 1979. My 23 co-workers and I did not leave the country until after the Shah had been gone about one month. I had many close friends in Iran, and I was very saddened over the next 10 years or so when I’d receive word when different ones of them were killed during or soon after the Revolution, or in the Iran-Iraq War. I enjoyed the people, the country and the culture, and have always wanted to go back.

I encourage you to read my recent articles here concerning Iran. One is quite long because it contains a strategic report I wrote about Iran in 1977 as part of my job while I was there. Also, take a look at my Dec 28th article on Quora.com about the sanctions against Iran. I updated the full picture, and also touched on the ballistic missile launch in the news. I noted previously that the general public keeps focusing mostly on American sanctions against Iran; little is said about the numerous UN Security Council resolutions which imposed sanctions on Iran, too. I watched the tape of a Dec 15th UN Security Council meeting where the ballistic missile launch was discussed as being a direct violation of one of the UN resolutions. Read my Dec 28th article on Quora.com for more information.

As of this writing, the general public is aware of six launch vehicles (rockets/missiles) the Iranian’s have engineering documentation for. Five of the six ballistic missiles are capable of being manufactured by Iran for operational use in nuclear weapons delivery. To date, four of the five operational models are medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM), and one is short range. All of the countries with operational nuclear weapons also have the ability to produce, and put satellites into orbit.

Part of the puzzle in tracking a country’s ability to deliver a nuclear weapon is that many missiles often serve in multiple roles of launching satellites, nuclear warheads, conventional high explosives, and biological/chemical weapons. Although the Iranian missiles listed below are incapable of striking the Continental United States, a range of 1,500 miles would allow Iran to attack locations as far away as: Budapest, Hungary; Minsk, Belarus; Moscow, Russia; all of India (except its eastern & southernmost provinces), Afghanistan, and Pakistan; lastly, anywhere in the Middle East & the Red Sea, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. This is why Iranian nuclear weapons capability is unacceptable by most United Nations members. Exacerbating the overall situation, Iran and North Korea have been partnered on nuclear weapons and launch vehicle development for quite some time.

**Iranian Missiles Capable of Launching and Delivering a Nuclear Warhead**
Model Name	Type	Range	Warhead (lbs)	Comments
Fajr-3	MRBM	1,500 miles	1,760	In sevice (2006)
Shahab-2	SRBM	1,200 miles	2,640	In sevice (1998)
Shahab-3	MRBM	1,260 miles	2,178	In sevice (2003)
Shahab-4	MRBM	1,200 miles	1,760	Design on hold
Sejil-1	MRBM	1,150 miles	Unavailable	In sevice (2014)
Sejil-2	MRBM	1,200 miles	Unavailable	In sevice (2014)

The REPORT on NATIONAL SECURITY KINETICS™

Reliable * Well Researched * Timely * No AI…100% Author Content

Tag Archives: U.S. Foreign Policy