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Foreign Policy Research & Analysis, Intelligence Collection, Analysis & Estimates, Military Operations, History & Cyber Warfare, National Security, Terrorism Information, U.S. Presidency, Weapon Systems

RNSK Vol I, Edition 1

Introduction

     This is the premiere Edition of The Report on National Security Kinetics™ (RNSK).  There are dozens of publications out there with content that touches on some of the RNSK Focus Areas, but, require regular monitoring of a half-dozen or more of them to cover it all.  The RNSK format has been designed around a set of Focus Areas to help reduce a reader’s effort in keeping tabs on an important set of topics.

     The RNSK Focus Areas have been selected by the editor based on 40+ years of experience as a U.S. military veteran, national security analyst, international business manager, writer, foreign policy researcher, college teacher, and military & presidential historian.  It has been my honor to meet many women & men with similar backgrounds, including a shared belief in the importance of family, strong morals, human dignity, personal integrity, and putting country above self.  Recognizing the Kinetic nature of National Security, factual & timely information related to the Focus Areas is an important factor to this editor and like-minded individuals.

The RNSK National Security Focus Areas are:

  • Government-related Policy and Actions (U.S. & non-U.S.)
  • Weapon Systems
  • Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Counter-Terrorism
  • Military Operations & Cyber Warfare
  • Historical Commentary

     These Focus Areas may not always be covered in each edition.  Instead, the content will vary from one edition to the next based on what readers are asking for, global events, and the topical insights of RNSK correspondents with many decades of experience.  RNSK content is:

  • Reliable, well researched and factual;
  • Written with minimal opinions, speculation, or someone’s Ouija board;
  • Relative and timely, but, not a cyclical news source; RNSK has no competition-driven publishing deadlines.

The Need for Sources with Trustworthy, Verifiable Facts

     With the widespread use of the internet, it puts a staggering level of content at our fingertips.  The challenge for us, however, is determining the utility of what we read.  Because our research & reading time is limited, it leads us to determine which information sources are most utilitarian, and fit the closest to our needs.  For the serious consumer of useful web-based information, it is understood there is no “perfect” source, nor “one-size-fits-all.”  We look for reliable information sources that provide the best content, without investing too much of our limited time and resources.  In short, we want a good deal!

     When I think about reliable information sources, it reminds me of my paternal grandfather, Albert Miller, a veteran of World War I and World War II.  In between the wars, and for his last 20 years in the workforce, he was a pressroom manager for the Los Angeles Times.  Although he was a loyal consumer of L.A. Times content, he also was a strong proponent of the philosophy, “believe only half of what you read, and nothing of what you hear.”  He was a voracious reader of nearly everything he got his hands on.  Coupled with pondering and introspection, he developed strong convictions based on objectivity.  If he were alive today, he would have already applied his philosophy by carefully studying internet content for the favorable characteristics noted above.  He would be scolding the public for not following his advice, and the global fallout over “fake news.”

History Repeats Itself

     Prior to World War I, the average person was not overly challenged in differentiating between reliable and unreliable information purveyed to the public.  Name brand public information back then included respected outlets such as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, The Economist, and The Nation.  After World War I, broadcast radio spread like wildfire across the globe, much the same way the Internet has in the past 20+ years.  To illustrate the rapid spread of broadcast radio going into 1922, the year opened with only 28 radio stations in the United States.  At the close of 1922, America could boast of having 570 commercial radio stations!

     Radio broadcasting became so pervasive by the 1930s that Congress enacted legislation to form the Federal Communications Commission to regulate the industry.  Just like television became the entertainment centerpiece in every home by the 1960s, radio held the same position from the 1920s through the 1940s.  In the first half of the 20th Century, radio was literally the human lifeline to the rest of the world, the same as the Internet is today.

     With the ever-increasing pace of a global society throughout the radio era, numerous people took the attitude that they were too busy, and did not have time to read a daily newspaper; the radio industry was more than happy to fill the gap.  Radio carried the news, weather, sports, church services, music, and programmed entertainment, to name a few.  Back then, different types of broadcasts were discernible…news programs and fictional entertainment were done in different styles.  The overreliance on radio for all aspects of life spawned a common phrase that carried the force-of-truth behind it, “hey, I just heard on the radio…”  If you heard it on the radio, it has to be true, right?

     The bubble of truth in radio was burst in 1938 with the broadcast that came to be known as, “The War of the Worlds.”  A 22-year old actor, Orson Welles, conducted a radio broadcast meant to be science fiction entertainment, but, it was delivered like a real newscast.  Millions of people heard Welles’ “report,” and actually thought the Earth was under alien invasion!  Even though Welles’ intent was entertainment, the public’s reliance on radio allowed them to be duped into thinking they were under alien attack.  If you heard it on the radio, it has to be true, right?

     Fast forward this to the internet age, but, with public overreliance on web-based content instead of radio, it has once again allowed agents-of-manipulation to blur the lines between fact and fiction.  An unchecked social media was/is the perfect place to sow disinformation and blur-the-lines.  In simple terms, with the veneer stripped back, it is slick, subtle lying; which isn’t very “social” by most people’s standards.  This is evident in all the stories about “fake news” and the Information Warfare conducted during the 2016 Presidential Election.  But, make no mistake, the blurring of fact and fiction seen in the past two years has nothing to do with entertainment, nor is it strictly one-upmanship between competing web-based information sources.

     Duping the public with disinformation during the age of radio, or today’s internet, is not just information warfare; the root of the matter goes much deeper.  So, it is true; history does repeat itself, but, why?

     Web-based information distortion in some cases is an act-of-war; much like the information subterfuge undertaken by both sides in World War II.  Let’s call it what it really is, a term that does not mince words…Espionage.  It may not be a shooting war, but, it is warfare, nonetheless.  The circumstances behind public communication in wartime England may have had its Fascist & Communists intriguers who angered government authorities and were carefully watched.  The moment they crossed-the-line from just stirring things up, to proof of subversion, they were going to jail for espionage, at the least.

How Does This Relate to the RNSK?

     The foregoing discussion bothers me…it bothers me a LOT.  We can all agree that fiction is entertaining, but, not when we are looking for, and expecting to find the facts.  But, even when we successfully cull-out fictional information, facts may still not be the facts.  What someone says or writes may not be pure fiction, or manipulated fake news, but, what about intentional or unintentional co-mingling of fact and opinion?  Any purveyor of information, regardless of media type, if they want to be seen as a viable source of factual information, they must exercise overt care in identifying when something is an expressed opinion, versus a confirmed fact.  Whether a purveyor of opinion is honestly expressing just their opinion, it can and does, influence other people’s thinking and opinions.  Expressing an opinion that is co-mingled with fact, is a disservice to the consumer, at best; at worst, it intends to convince someone how to think and act.

     When it comes to writing and publishing the RNSK, the intent is to avoid the foregoing communication/information problems by the guidelines previously mentioned, to wit:

  • Reliable, well researched and factual;
  • Written with minimal opinions, speculation, or someone’s Ouija board;
  • Relative and timely, but, not a cyclical news source; RNSK has no competition-driven publishing deadlines.

     So, if you have an interest in rounding-out your national security knowledge in today’s kinetic environment, and want the confidence of knowing the content is based on the foregoing parameters in a defined set of Focus Areas, and has been written with an eye toward the values imbued by America’s Founding Fathers, then The Report on National Security Kinetics™  is what you need…Welcome!

     This is enough for now; the introduction has been done.  Rather than trying to include an actual content article buried at the bottom of this premiere edition, where it likely would get lost, we will begin publishing informational content in the next edition.  In the beginning, RNSK will be published bi-weekly.  If a published article is prepared by a correspondent other than the editor, their name/credentials will appear at the end of it.  Unless otherwise noted, all other content is by the editor & chief correspondent.

Ciao,

Steve Miller
Editor
The Report on National Security Kinetics™
Seattle, WA. USA
http://www.millermgmtsys.com

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Military Operations, History & Cyber Warfare

Understanding why U.S. Psychological Warfare Operations do not use drones to infiltrate propaganda into North Korea.

Global Hawk flying environmental mapping missions in Latin America, Caribbean An RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft.   (U.S. Air Force photo/Bobbi Zapka)

     My USAF unit was the sole American military outfit that flew drone reconnaissance missions for 11 years during the Vietnam War in Southeast Asia .  Occasionally our unit, the 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (SRW), was asked by the secretive Studies and Observations Group (SOG) to launch and fly “Psy Ops” drone missions over North Vietnam.  SOG was the unit reporting to the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV), that directed all of the covert military operations during the War.  MACV-SOG’s Psy Ops department cooked-up quite a few propaganda leaflet campaigns for dissemination over North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply route in eastern Laos.  What follows here is drawn from our squadron’s experience and the operational challenges faced in flying leaflet dispensing sorties over territory that is denied airspace.

     Keep in mind that any sort of written propaganda operation has to be well thought-out to realize even the slightest amount of perceived value.  In any sort of Psy Ops program the greatest obstacle to success is the intended audience has been receiving a steady diet of propaganda manufactured by their own government.  This was the case with Germany in WW II, North Vietnam, and definitely with current-day North Korea.  In North Korea’s situation, their citizens have been subjected to a state-sponsored Psy Ops program for more than 60 years.  A good Pys Ops program contains a high percentage of factual information that will carefully lead someone to believe the whole thing.

     Airborne leaflet dispensing missions in denied airspace were/are extremely dangerous.  To have any effect at all, the leaflets have to be distributed by the millions over a wide area.  This means the air delivery vehicle has to be large enough to carry a heavy payload.  None of the quad-copters or other commercially available drones would be suitable…their payloads would be a mere drop-in-the-bucket.  Even the more common military drones, like the MQ-1 Predator, or the larger MQ-9 Reaper, would not have the sufficient payload, or ability to evade North Korean air defenses.

     In Vietnam, leaflet dispensing missions conducted in the less dense air defense areas were undertaken with MC-130E Combat Talon aircraft from the 15th Special Operations Squadron.  The MC-130s were specially equipped for flights through denied airspace.  But, no one was foolhardy enough to tempt fate by trying to fly an MC-130 on a Pys Ops mission over the heavily defended capital of Hanoi, or the deep-water port of Haiphong.  If a Psy Ops mission had to be conducted in those areas, our unit was asked to do it with a Ryan Aeronautical Model 147N jet-powered drone.

     Our Model 147 drones (later given the DOD designator AN/AQM-34) were all purpose-built for a certain type of reconnaissance mission – photo imagery, signals intelligence, etc.  Our unit became quite successful in flying high-speed reconnaissance drones over North Vietnam.  Eventually, the military spooks from MACV-SOG and other MACV departments began asking our operating location (OL-20) at Bien Hoa Air Base, near Saigon, to fly other types of drone missions besides reconnaissance.  One of the alternatives was for ECM (electronic counter-measures) missions to dump radar-defeating chaff.  Chaff dispensers (ALE-2,4 or 5) had been carried on fighter jets, but, the missions were getting too dangerous for the aircrews.  When OL-20 was asked to use Model 147 drones to fly chaff missions, they were not going to use the expensive versions crammed with intelligence collection gear; they had Ryan send over stripped-down versions with wing hard-points to upload the dispensers.  After flying a few successful ECM chaff missions, MACV-SOG inquired whether the same drones & chaff dispensers could deliver propaganda leaflets over Hanoi.  This was doable, and the slang term assigned to these birds/missions was “Bull_ _ _ _ Bomber.”

     The photograph shown below is a Ryan Aeronautical RPV (remotely piloted vehicle). OL-20’s drone crew chiefs are uploading ALE-4 leaflet dispensers to a Model 147N prior to a Psy Ops leaflet mission.  As you can see, the leaflet dispensers were large and very heavy.  It was SOP in the drone maintenance manuals to upload the birds first to the launch aircraft – then the leaflet dispensers were attached last.  Not wanting to take any chances, the technicians have temporarily installed a cargo strap under the drone as a safety measure.

     These no-frills drones were flown on dispenser missions, expecting them to not make it back home.  Ironically, however, quite a few managed to make it back to the recovery area in South Vietnam without being shot down!

     Several people have asked me about drone operations in denied airspace.  I hope that providing this information about American military exigencies in dealing with actual leaflet dispensing drone missions over North Vietnam will demonstrate what would have to occur to attempt something just as complex over North Korea.

                                                     Steve Miller, Copyright (c) 2016

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Intelligence Collection, Analysis & Estimates

Book Review: Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency, by Thomas L. Ahern Jr.

Steve Miller, Copyright (c) 2011

vietnam-declassified-book-cover

Note: This article first appeared in the Air Force Research Institute’s “Air and Space Power Journal” in the Summer 2011 Edition.

Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency by Thomas L. Ahern Jr. University Press of Kentucky, 2010, 450 pp., $40.00 (hardcover).

Anyone intent upon a serious study of the Vietnam War or of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) operations in general, must read this book. Of the more than 1,000 hours I’ve spent researching the war and the nearly 300 books and oral interview transcripts I have read, Ahern’s study stands as one of the best accounts of America’s involvement in Indochina. He deserves a standing ovation for giving us the unvarnished truth.

Anytime an author attempts to write a book about a controversial subject, he or she knows that not everyone will agree with the results. The real challenge involves getting the story right without creating more negative thinkers. Given the amount of mud tossed around about Vietnam, an author must have iron-willed courage to buck the trend—exactly the case with Ahern. He properly acknowledges situations in which judgment should have been better or which produced mediocre results. But Ahern does three things that reflect his integrity:

1. He stays clear of making editorial comments or offering personal opinions.

2. Even though many different types of intelligence operations ran simultaneously, Ahern keeps the reader informed about the chronology and the direct or indirect linkages between them.

3. He avoids using his professional expertise to fill-in gaps in the story or fabricate topic linkages. Ahern wisely keeps his literary license in his pocket, letting the facts tell the story.

I appreciate the author’s effort to prepare a balanced narrative that covers the various intelligence programs. He takes the right course by not dwelling on the well-known Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) or Phoenix Program. By time a reader finishes the book, it is apparent that very few programs did poorly while the CIA was in-charge. Ahern notes the common project pattern: develop and launch it in one or two provinces, prove that it works, and then decide to roll it out nationally. Generally speaking, project incubation went well under CIA guidance.  It was not uncommon, however, for a Program to fall on hard times when it transitioned to a larger effort and the CIA relinquished control.

In the best part of Vietnam Declassified, the author shows how he and his colleagues tirelessly pressed forward, trying to salvage something of enduring value. Ahern notes that most CIA officers serving in Vietnam realized the near impossibility of having an operation develop the “legs” to do well all over the country or make any long-term gains. He cites an exasperating meeting about a problem with a certain pacification program, during which someone tossed out a new idea. William Colby (the CIA station chief in Saigon, and a future CIA director) replied that he was willing to try anything—if it would work (pp. 69, 86).

Ahern purposely—and correctly, I might add—calls the reader’s attention to repeating themes throughout the text. Vietnam Declassified shows the many recurring actions/inactions outside CIA control for which the agency nevertheless received blame and/or an assignment to tidy up a mess not of its making.

The book clearly points out that for any given intelligence operation, the Saigon government and armed forces, provincial as well as local leaders, and the US military or State Department might have held differing goals for the desired outcome; however, Ahern demonstrates the CIA’s consistency in resisting involvement in actions having dubious intelligence value. He demonstrates the fine line present in operations, whether overt or covert, that successfully hid a clandestine intelligence-collection effort. Early in the book, he explains one of the more common accusations made about the CIA in Vietnam—that it participated in operations perceived to have no intelligence value. Ahern reveals that, on the one hand, outsiders who concluded that the CIA’s participation in an operation produced nothing beneficial, actually validated the agency’s concealment of an intelligence operation inside a pacification program. On the other hand, the CIA had to “take it on the chin” for purportedly spending taxpayer dollars on something without intelligence value.

Coming out of Vietnam, the CIA carried the undeserved image of a power-hungry loose cannon, but the author debunks this paradigm. Ahern explains that, aside from avoiding power grabs on ethical grounds, the CIA actually had the least amount of manpower and one of the smallest budgets in-country. Although he does not say so explicitly, I have the impression that the CIA saw its role as a “counterinsurgency project manager,” not as a full-scale “production (i.e., combatant) manager.”

One of the thorniest issues Ahern mentions had to do with convincing South Vietnamese leaders that the war was in the countryside, not in the cities. The CIA routinely coached Saigon leaders on the “battle” not being against Hanoi or merely about stopping the Vietcong from bothering rural peasants. The author reminds us that the Americans constantly repeated and demonstrated this particular message, starting in 1954 when they arrived and the French left. According to the CIA, the real task lay in convincing the peasants to side with Saigon before the Vietcong talked them into going the other way.

Vietnam Declassified left a lasting impression. Specifically, Ahern writes in several places about the CIA as a trailblazer in Vietnam, as was the author himself. In fact, he observes that “most [CIA] officers who served there had no previous experience of third world insurgency, and many of us . . . found ourselves facing challenges and exercising authority at a level well above the norm for our rank and experience” (p. 4). It seems that in situations in which young officers lack the extrinsic benefits of manpower, money, equipment, precedence, and experience yet still need to get the job done, they do so, according to the author, by using intrinsic skills they could not buy or receive from someone else—tenacity, creativity, and courage.

When I closed Thomas Ahern’s book, a time-honored passage kept ringing in my ears: “We who have done so much, for so long, with so little, are now qualified to do everything with nothing.” Excellent work, Mr. Ahern.

Steve Miller, Copyright (c) 2011

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