Category Archives: National Security

Foreign Policy Research & Analysis, Intelligence Collection, Analysis & Estimates, Military Operations, History & Cyber Warfare, National Security, Terrorism Information, U.S. Presidency, Weapon Systems

RNSK Vol I, Edition 1

Introduction

     This is the premiere Edition of The Report on National Security Kinetics™ (RNSK).  There are dozens of publications out there with content that touches on some of the RNSK Focus Areas, but, require regular monitoring of a half-dozen or more of them to cover it all.  The RNSK format has been designed around a set of Focus Areas to help reduce a reader’s effort in keeping tabs on an important set of topics.

     The RNSK Focus Areas have been selected by the editor based on 40+ years of experience as a U.S. military veteran, national security analyst, international business manager, writer, foreign policy researcher, college teacher, and military & presidential historian.  It has been my honor to meet many women & men with similar backgrounds, including a shared belief in the importance of family, strong morals, human dignity, personal integrity, and putting country above self.  Recognizing the Kinetic nature of National Security, factual & timely information related to the Focus Areas is an important factor to this editor and like-minded individuals.

The RNSK National Security Focus Areas are:

  • Government-related Policy and Actions (U.S. & non-U.S.)
  • Weapon Systems
  • Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Counter-Terrorism
  • Military Operations & Cyber Warfare
  • Historical Commentary

     These Focus Areas may not always be covered in each edition.  Instead, the content will vary from one edition to the next based on what readers are asking for, global events, and the topical insights of RNSK correspondents with many decades of experience.  RNSK content is:

  • Reliable, well researched and factual;
  • Written with minimal opinions, speculation, or someone’s Ouija board;
  • Relative and timely, but, not a cyclical news source; RNSK has no competition-driven publishing deadlines.

The Need for Sources with Trustworthy, Verifiable Facts

     With the widespread use of the internet, it puts a staggering level of content at our fingertips.  The challenge for us, however, is determining the utility of what we read.  Because our research & reading time is limited, it leads us to determine which information sources are most utilitarian, and fit the closest to our needs.  For the serious consumer of useful web-based information, it is understood there is no “perfect” source, nor “one-size-fits-all.”  We look for reliable information sources that provide the best content, without investing too much of our limited time and resources.  In short, we want a good deal!

     When I think about reliable information sources, it reminds me of my paternal grandfather, Albert Miller, a veteran of World War I and World War II.  In between the wars, and for his last 20 years in the workforce, he was a pressroom manager for the Los Angeles Times.  Although he was a loyal consumer of L.A. Times content, he also was a strong proponent of the philosophy, “believe only half of what you read, and nothing of what you hear.”  He was a voracious reader of nearly everything he got his hands on.  Coupled with pondering and introspection, he developed strong convictions based on objectivity.  If he were alive today, he would have already applied his philosophy by carefully studying internet content for the favorable characteristics noted above.  He would be scolding the public for not following his advice, and the global fallout over “fake news.”

History Repeats Itself

     Prior to World War I, the average person was not overly challenged in differentiating between reliable and unreliable information purveyed to the public.  Name brand public information back then included respected outlets such as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, The Economist, and The Nation.  After World War I, broadcast radio spread like wildfire across the globe, much the same way the Internet has in the past 20+ years.  To illustrate the rapid spread of broadcast radio going into 1922, the year opened with only 28 radio stations in the United States.  At the close of 1922, America could boast of having 570 commercial radio stations!

     Radio broadcasting became so pervasive by the 1930s that Congress enacted legislation to form the Federal Communications Commission to regulate the industry.  Just like television became the entertainment centerpiece in every home by the 1960s, radio held the same position from the 1920s through the 1940s.  In the first half of the 20th Century, radio was literally the human lifeline to the rest of the world, the same as the Internet is today.

     With the ever-increasing pace of a global society throughout the radio era, numerous people took the attitude that they were too busy, and did not have time to read a daily newspaper; the radio industry was more than happy to fill the gap.  Radio carried the news, weather, sports, church services, music, and programmed entertainment, to name a few.  Back then, different types of broadcasts were discernible…news programs and fictional entertainment were done in different styles.  The overreliance on radio for all aspects of life spawned a common phrase that carried the force-of-truth behind it, “hey, I just heard on the radio…”  If you heard it on the radio, it has to be true, right?

     The bubble of truth in radio was burst in 1938 with the broadcast that came to be known as, “The War of the Worlds.”  A 22-year old actor, Orson Welles, conducted a radio broadcast meant to be science fiction entertainment, but, it was delivered like a real newscast.  Millions of people heard Welles’ “report,” and actually thought the Earth was under alien invasion!  Even though Welles’ intent was entertainment, the public’s reliance on radio allowed them to be duped into thinking they were under alien attack.  If you heard it on the radio, it has to be true, right?

     Fast forward this to the internet age, but, with public overreliance on web-based content instead of radio, it has once again allowed agents-of-manipulation to blur the lines between fact and fiction.  An unchecked social media was/is the perfect place to sow disinformation and blur-the-lines.  In simple terms, with the veneer stripped back, it is slick, subtle lying; which isn’t very “social” by most people’s standards.  This is evident in all the stories about “fake news” and the Information Warfare conducted during the 2016 Presidential Election.  But, make no mistake, the blurring of fact and fiction seen in the past two years has nothing to do with entertainment, nor is it strictly one-upmanship between competing web-based information sources.

     Duping the public with disinformation during the age of radio, or today’s internet, is not just information warfare; the root of the matter goes much deeper.  So, it is true; history does repeat itself, but, why?

     Web-based information distortion in some cases is an act-of-war; much like the information subterfuge undertaken by both sides in World War II.  Let’s call it what it really is, a term that does not mince words…Espionage.  It may not be a shooting war, but, it is warfare, nonetheless.  The circumstances behind public communication in wartime England may have had its Fascist & Communists intriguers who angered government authorities and were carefully watched.  The moment they crossed-the-line from just stirring things up, to proof of subversion, they were going to jail for espionage, at the least.

How Does This Relate to the RNSK?

     The foregoing discussion bothers me…it bothers me a LOT.  We can all agree that fiction is entertaining, but, not when we are looking for, and expecting to find the facts.  But, even when we successfully cull-out fictional information, facts may still not be the facts.  What someone says or writes may not be pure fiction, or manipulated fake news, but, what about intentional or unintentional co-mingling of fact and opinion?  Any purveyor of information, regardless of media type, if they want to be seen as a viable source of factual information, they must exercise overt care in identifying when something is an expressed opinion, versus a confirmed fact.  Whether a purveyor of opinion is honestly expressing just their opinion, it can and does, influence other people’s thinking and opinions.  Expressing an opinion that is co-mingled with fact, is a disservice to the consumer, at best; at worst, it intends to convince someone how to think and act.

     When it comes to writing and publishing the RNSK, the intent is to avoid the foregoing communication/information problems by the guidelines previously mentioned, to wit:

  • Reliable, well researched and factual;
  • Written with minimal opinions, speculation, or someone’s Ouija board;
  • Relative and timely, but, not a cyclical news source; RNSK has no competition-driven publishing deadlines.

     So, if you have an interest in rounding-out your national security knowledge in today’s kinetic environment, and want the confidence of knowing the content is based on the foregoing parameters in a defined set of Focus Areas, and has been written with an eye toward the values imbued by America’s Founding Fathers, then The Report on National Security Kinetics™  is what you need…Welcome!

     This is enough for now; the introduction has been done.  Rather than trying to include an actual content article buried at the bottom of this premiere edition, where it likely would get lost, we will begin publishing informational content in the next edition.  In the beginning, RNSK will be published bi-weekly.  If a published article is prepared by a correspondent other than the editor, their name/credentials will appear at the end of it.  Unless otherwise noted, all other content is by the editor & chief correspondent.

Ciao,

Steve Miller
Editor
The Report on National Security Kinetics™
Seattle, WA. USA
http://www.millermgmtsys.com

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Foreign Policy Research & Analysis, National Security, Terrorism Information

What is the legal definition of “National Security” established by the US Courts?

 

To get the full treatment on the topic of National Security from the U.S. point of view, take a look at my series of general FAQs I wrote for Quora at the following link:

https://www.quora.com/topic/National-Security/faq

One of the FAQs provides the U.S. Government definition of National Security, as follows:

Within the context of how the United States defines National Security, it was developed and promulgated via Joint Publication #1 by the Department of Defense, Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff. The meaning is: A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relations position; or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.

In terms of a “legal” definition of National Security either in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs), or anything based on a Federal District, Appeals or Supreme Court ruling that might create “case law,” you will not find anything. The reason why is the term, by its very nature, is too broad, and any level in the U.S. court system would be committing “judicial suicide” if they attempted to render a felony trial verdict based on an attempt to fully encapsulate a definition of National Security.

Not trying to be flippant, but, attempting to create a single, legally binding definition of National Security that could hold up to an ultimate determination by the U.S. Supreme Court, would be just as difficult as to pin down as legally defining the term “Chocolate Donut.”

Seriously, take a look at my National Security FAQs. Part of the problem with trying to pin down a legally binding definition of National Security is simply that it is a moving target that is constantly evolving. My FAQs denote some of the more recent developments that now pose a National Security threat that no one would have dreamed of 50–60 years ago. Here are a few examples of what I mean:

  1. Global Climate Change;
  2. Trans-National Crime;
  3. A Global Disease Pandemic;
  4. Cyber-based Infrastructure Threats;
  5. Space-borne Threats. And this is not just “Star Wars” stuff with killer satellites and lasers. The U.S. is the ONLY country in the World to track the tens of thousands of pieces of space junk, defunct satellites, micro-meteorites, et al, that could potentially enter the earth’s atmosphere, or possibly collide accidentally with an important spacecraft up there. A burned-out Russian satellite has already collided with an American in-use satellite that before the collision, there were just two objects, and now the debris has made thousands of objects.

If you go back to the 1930s, not only were the threats listed above either unknown, or considered non-threatening, but, no one had an inkling about a nuclear holocaust being a National Security threat either.

These are just some of the things we have added to the National Security threat list since World War II. I am sure there is more to come, and our understanding of what constitutes National Security will continue to evolve, too.

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National Security

Presidential Findings and Their Impact on U.S. National Security

reagan-presidential-finding-nicaragua_dec1981Presidential Finding signed by President Reagan to authorize the CIA to conduct covert operations in Central America to aid the Contra rebels in their fight against the Communist-backed Sandinista government in Nicaraqua.

During the Vietnam War nearly every kind of intelligence operation you can think of was undertaken by the U.S. Intelligence Community.  The four most heavily engaged agencies, starting with the most utilized first, were: the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.  As the War dragged on, with public, Congressional, and Presidential frustration mounting, increased pressure was applied on intelligence activities, especially the CIA, to help turn the War in a more positive direction.

Thomas Ahern, a CIA intelligence officer, who started his career in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, wrote an excellent book, “Vietnam Declassified,” about the CIA and the many types of intelligence operations undertaken in Vietnam.  He cites an exasperating meeting about a problem with a certain pacification program led by the CIA, during which someone tossed out a new idea. William Colby (future CIA director), who was the CIA’s Saigon station chief at the time, replied that he was willing to try anything—if it would work.  The mounting, across-the-board frustration, left the CIA and its cohort agencies, grasping at straws.

William Colby became the new Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in September 1973, just a month after American combat activity ceased in Southeast Asia.  Colby’s tenure would be a brief 2 ½ years.  Before the year was over, allegations began to surface in the press about questionable intelligence activities during the War.  Press allegations continued throughout 1974, and murmurings started-up in Congress about possible Intelligence Community improprieties.   By time Colby left office he would arguably hold the distinction of testifying before Congress more than any other DCI.  By January 1975 both the Senate, and House of Representatives, were conducting hearings about the impropriety allegations.  Senator Frank Church chaired one committee, and Congressman Otis Pike chaired a similar investigation committee in the House.

All of this external attention on the Intelligence Community resulted in passage of several new laws to tighten-up accountability and oversight of certain critical, intelligence operations.  For the most part, the type of operations that were closely looked at, and caused the most angst with Congress, were those in which the importance to U.S. National Security was ill-defined; in essence, justifying a direct benefit to the Unites States was a stretch, at best.

U.S. Foreign Policy has a range of options available to the President in order to achieve his goals.  The low end of the scale espouses the use of diplomacy to achieve American goals overseas.  At the opposite end of the spectrum from diplomacy is military intervention.  Starting in the post-World War II era, and continuing to this day, foreign relations between countries have become so complex that often times using pure diplomacy is ineffective; but, military intervention is too much.  The gray area between State Department diplomacy, and Defense Department military operations, is often the domain of the CIA using Covert Action to achieve American foreign policy goals.  It is this genre of intelligence operations that garnered such a strong backlash from Congress and the public after Vietnam.

Regardless the type of intelligence operation being mounted, they all have an appropriate level of Operational Security – “OPSEC.”  OPSEC is usually manifested in three categories:

• Clandestine operation:  An operation sponsored or conducted by  a U.S. government department or agency in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.  Clandestine operations are the usual means of OPSEC for espionage and/or intelligence collection, which is the “bread n’ butter” spying conducted by the CIA’s National Clandestine Service.  The biggest reason intelligence collection is conducted with clandestine OPSEC is most adversaries, upon detecting espionage activity, move quickly to render useless anything that was purloined.  For example, clandestinely photographing an enemy’s communication code books.  If the collection activity is discovered, the enemy will stop using the compromised codes, and the photographed code book has no further value.  Being undetected is paramount in clandestine operation.

• Covert operation: An operation of the United States Government that is planned and executed to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly (i.e.; plausible deniability).

• Clandestine and Covert operation:  The operation must be undetected, and the sponsor’s identity is concealed.

By the very nature of clandestine operations, they tend to be low-key.  Any sort of violence associated with the operation tends to cause the lack of detection to be tossed right out the window.

Covert operations conducted by the CIA, for example, are less concerned about remaining undetected during the operation, or afterwards.  Of greater concern is running the operation so it cannot be traced back to the United States.  In this sense, it is a fact-of-life that covert operations tend to have more violence attached, destroying property and/or killing enemy personnel to prevent them from reporting who or what they saw.  As noted previously, when diplomacy fails, but, direct military intervention is too heavy handed, a plausibly deniable covert operation often becomes the tool-of-choice for resolving vexing problems.  Up until Colby’s DCI tour, and the Church & Pike Committees, the CIA regularly conducted operations using all three OPSEC categories.  Covert operations bears the majority of public and Congressional opposition.  This led Congress to add language in Title 50 U.S. Code, requiring a documented Presidential Finding for covert operations.

Prior to the law being changed to require a Presidential Finding, an extremely sensitive covert operation was usually briefed to the President for his buy-in.  The law was moot, however, on any formal requirement to seek the President’s buy-in, nor was there a requirement to document the Presidential Briefing in writing, nor to obtain an actual signature by the President, approving the covert action.  Aside from the President’s buy-in, the law was also silent about informing key members of Congress about an impending covert action.

Once the law took effect, all covert actions had to be documented in a signed Presidential Finding, and it had to contain an explanation of why it was necessary to conduct the operation, including the identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States, and the covert action’s importance to U.S. National Security.  Lastly, the Presidential Finding must be presented to both Congressional intelligence committees.

Steve Miller, (c) Copyright 2016

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National Security

National Security Letters: What Are They, How Are They Managed & Implemented, and What is Their Impact on U.S. National Security Policy?

national_security_letter-sample_nov2007

A National Security Letter issued to the Internet Archive by the FBI in November 2007.

A national security letter (NSL) is a type of subpoena that can be issued by designated U.S. intelligence & security establishments, and does not require approval by a federal court judge. The Right to Financial Privacy Act, Stored Communications Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act, all contain provisions that allow the USG to request & obtain information relevant to an approved national security investigation. Previously, there was no uniform statute implementing NSL procedures; so, a law to do so was enacted.  The two primary concerns voiced in opposition to the NSL’s usage is:  an NSL does not require a court order (i.e.; signed by a federal court judge), and NSL’s normally contain language directing the NSL recipient to not publicly disclose any aspect of the NSL, including the simple fact of acknowledging receipt of an NSL.

There are several federal court cases concerning the legality of the NSL Law.  It will likely end up in the Supreme Court’s hands because the two sides to the issue are not backing down based on lower court rulings thus far.  It doesn’t mean the Supreme Court will necessarily have to take the case; they could decline and let a lower court ruling stand as is.  The Law currently states an NSL can only request non-content information, for example: recorded transactions, dialed phone numbers, and e-mail addresses. Since the above statutes pertain to legal entities, such as a real person or a company, their names are not protected information.  Although organizations such as the phone company or an internet e-mail provider that receives an NSL are barred by the Law from disclosing the content of e-mails or phone calls, the names of the parties involved are releasable.

Steve Miller, (c) Copyright 2016

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National Security

Academically speaking, what is “Security” in This Day and Age?

national-security-graphic_oct2016

The first factor to consider in discussing “Security,” or as it’s more commonly known, “National Security,” is some basic definitions applicable to any country.  These “basics” are not all inclusive, but, they represent the most common National Security factors that are intrinsic to any country’s sovereignty.

  1. Citizen protection, health & well being;
  2. Protecting a country’s strategic infrastructure;
  3. Physical protection of a country’s sovereign territory;
  4. Ensure the security of a country’s natural resources;
  5. Ensuring the political stability of the country’s governmental institutions (i.e.; executive branch, legislature, and judiciary);
  6. Maintain a country’s free access to adjacent international waters and airspace.

Every country has the right to at least the preceding National Security measures without encroachment by any other state actor, non-state actor, or by externally encouraged insurrection.

Most third world countries are incapable of looking beyond these six basic National Security factors.  The truth be told, many third world nations are challenged to the hilt just trying to keep their basic factors from encroachment.  In a general sense, third world countries are so self-absorbed just trying to get the six basics right, that there’s little means, opportunity or time to concern themselves with a crisis brewing in a far off land, and whether that other country’s strife could somehow effect their own country.  An example of this might be a country like Laos, and the ISIS conflict raging in Syria and Iraq.  It is unlikely the ISIS conflict has any direct or even indirect affect on Laotian National Security.  And if the ISIS conflict did have an impact on Laos, what could Laos do about it? Nothing.

But, could the same be said for ISIS’ impact on Great Britain?  No, it could not.  The larger the economy, the greater the infrastructure, the increased sophistication of a country’s society or industry, a higher degree of advanced education systems (i.e.; colleges, trade schools, etc), the higher per capita worker earnings, and Gross Domestic Product means a country like Great Britain has more tactical and strategic interest of problems brewing in other countries.  Great Britain may have a great need for Middle-eastern oil, or they have significant business interests in foreign countries, etc.  In a nutshell, a world economic and military power like Great Britain would not be able to maintain the security and prosperity it has attained by only concerning itself with the “basic six.”

The U.S. Congress enacted legislation over six years ago, requiring the President to publish every five years, a National Security Strategy.  I have pasted a hyperlink below, so you can review the 2015 NSS yourself.  Two definitions pasted below are the U.S. Government’s official position:

Security: 1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness.  2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security.

National Security: A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relations position; or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.

The 2015 NSS did not change the 2010 U.S. National Enduring Interests that form the backbone of the current NSS:

  1. The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
  2. A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
  3. Respect for universal values at home and around the world, and;
  4. A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

The 2015 NSS listed the following top strategic risks to U.S. interests:

  1. Catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland or critical infrastructure;
  2. Threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and our allies;
  3. Global economic crisis or widespread economic slowdown;
  4. Proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction;
  5. Severe global infectious disease outbreaks;
  6. Climate change;
  7. Major energy market disruptions, and;
  8. Significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime).

The United States learned 115 years ago under the leadership of President Theodore Roosevelt, that America no longer had the ability to remain isolated; the relationship to other countries, was now of strategic interest to American prosperity.  This is why the U.S. Armed Forces are deployed globally to ensure a number of issues do not affect the United States.  The 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated what can and will happen on U.S. soil, if the U.S. fails to project their security interests worldwide.  The U.S. can no longer remain insulated and expect the problems overseas to remain there.  Problems & crises elsewhere will come to our shores if our National Security interests do not go beyond the basic six.

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doc…

     Steve Miller, Copyright (c) 2016

 

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